Introduction
The Greek markets have been criticized over the years because of their imperfect competitive structure. In particular, the European Commission and the OECD are in favour of boosting competition in the most influential markets of any economy. If competition is enhanced, then social welfare will tend to be equal to the optimal level proposed by perfect competition. Thereby, the markets will be operating efficiently by utilizing the production capabilities of the firms to their fullest. The European Commission (2012) has announced the formulation of a policy framework under which the European Union members can reach new growth levels by developing fully integrated networks. The main intention of this framework is similar to the Single Market Mechanism (SEM) which was introduced in 1987. It corresponds to the facilitation of an efficient market structure in which the setting price of the firms will tend to be equal to their marginal cost.
Moreover, the OECD (2012) provides evidence that the Greek markets are the most heavily regulated within the OECD members due to a number of legislations that do not allow competition to flourish. They impose a number of restrictions, such as barriers to entry or very high fixed costs that discourage new firms to enter the market, thus providing the incumbent firms with market power. The main argument of the aforementioned reports is that competition results in increased output growth by enhancing economic activity. Consequently, increased production will lead to additional employment which will boost gross national income and the purchasing power parity of consumers.
If this happens, then firms will gain more revenue due to increased sales and innovation will be used as a tool of competition. For this reason, there is a need of particular indicators expressed in terms of pricing and production decisions that can identify the degree of market power in various industries and sectors. In this context, the price-cost margin can be used as an indicator of price markup over the cost of inputs, such as intermediate inputs, labour and capital. As a result, whenever the price level exceeds the marginal cost of inputs, there is a degree of market power reflected by a higher price level compared to the optimal level of perfect competition.
The methodology provided by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) will be employed in this study in order to identify the market structure of the two most influential industries of the Greek economy: the service and the manufacturing industry 3 . This methodology is known as the Hall-Roeger approach, under which the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is independent of the growth rate of nominal capital productivity. Under perfect competition, the growth rate of value added must be equal to the growth rate of inputs. This equality is significant for market efficiency because it provides consumers with higher product quality as a result of lower prices and higher innovation (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2013) . However, if the former growth rate exceeds the latter, the market is characterized by imperfect competition. This happens because the price level is higher compared to the one of perfect competition, thus resulting in under-production.
This study applies the Hall-Roeger approach in the Greek manufacturing and service industries under a three-step approach as introduced by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011) . The first step concerns the estimation of the price-cost margin in both industries over the period . The second step employs the cross section specification by identifying the price markup in the 23 manufacturing and the 26 service 2-digit ISIC sectors of the panel data set individually. Lastly, the third step employs the time series specification through the estimation of the price cost margin of both industries for each year over 1973-2007. Consequently, this study aims to complement the findings of Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011 , 2012a , 2012b , 2013 and Polemis (2014a Polemis ( , 2014b Polemis ( , 2014c ) of the degree of market power in the Greek manufacturing and service sectors.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review of the price cost margin approach; Section 3 develops the model formulation; Section 4 presents the methodology; Section 5 provides and discusses the empirical findings; and section 6 offers a conclusion.
Literature review
An important contribution to the price-cost margin literature was made by Hall (1988) under the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive when the price level is equal to the marginal cost of the firms. When the price level is higher, the market structure is considered to be uncompetitive. However, while the price level is observable, the marginal production cost of the firms may not be known. As a result, Hall overcame this drawback by showing that the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is independent of the growth rate of 3 The service industry contributes to Greek annual nominal GDP by approximately 80.4%, while the manufacturing industry contributes by 15.8% (World Bank, 2016) .
nominal capital productivity. The price-cost margin approach was applied in the United
States manufacturing industry and provided evidence of market power as the price level was higher than the marginal cost of production.
In particular, Solow (1957) introduced the concept of residual in the production process by taking into account a production function which allowed technical change to be included along with the inputs of labour and capital. By applying this formulation in the United States over 1909-1949, where output per hour approximately increased by 100%, he found that 12.5% of the increment in labour productivity could be attributed to increase capital per hour. However, the remaining 77.5% is explained by different factors than labour and capital accumulation which refer to the Solow residual. For this reason, the calculation of such unobserved shocks may not be feasible and thus, they may restrict the calculation of the price-cost margin.
Nevertheless, Roeger (1995) expanded this framework by taking into consideration the difference between the production-based (primal) Solow Residual (PRS) and the costbased (dual) Solow Residual (DSR). This formulation is used in order to eliminate the unobservable shock of productivity and thus, obtain an unbiased estimate of market power.
The indicator of market power is reflected by the difference between the growth rate of value added and the growth rate of inputs. Consequently, this is the final form of the markup equation which is employed by many studies over a number of industries in various economies.
In particular, there have been several studies that utilize the Hall-Roeger approach in order to test the degree of market power in the United States manufacturing industry. Shapiro (1987) and Norrbin (1993) found evidence in favour of markups consistent with oligopolistic pricing decisions as the manufacturing firms have been operating under imperfect competitive conduct. Bhuyan and Lopez (1998) and decreasing price-cost margins since the 1960s because the main factor influencing this measure is the share of imports in this industry. As a result of increasing foreign competition, the price level fell, thus converging to the one of perfect competition.
Moreover, Martins et al. (1996) Overall, the aforementioned studies conclude that the majority of the constituent industries and sectors exhibit a degree of market power expressed in terms of positive pricecost margins. This means that the price level exceeds the marginal cost of production, thus allowing firms to enjoy positive profit levels through under-production. As a result, the degree of social efficiency is not at its optimal level as consumer surplus is exploited by firms.
In this context, the Hall-Roeger approach provides a sufficient empirical tool of analysis that allows the investigation of market power in several industries.
Model formulation and data
The approach employed in this study corresponds to the model developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) in order to provide an unbiased estimate of market power. In particular, an industry is assumed that produces output ( ) according to a homogeneous production function using three inputs: intermediate inputs ( ) 4 , labour ( ) and capital
where is an index of total factor productivity (Hicks neutral productivity term) reflecting technological progress and t denotes the time interval. Any output variation is independent of input fluctuations through disembodied changes in technology. According to such production function, Hall (1988) showed that the production-based (primal) Solow Residual can be defined as the difference between output and input growth weighted by their shares in total value added. However, in this study, output is expressed in terms of gross output and thus, total value added is replaced by this measure. For this reason, the variable of intermediate inputs is included in the production function in order to avoid biased overestimated markup values.
The main assumptions of this formulation are (i) constant returns to scale, (ii) imperfect competition in product markets, and (iii) perfect competition in the input markets.
Therefore, the Solow Residual for this study is given by , where is the marginal cost of production and is the price markup over marginal cost 5 . However, the estimation of is problematic in equation (2) due to the presence of correlation between the measure of productivity growth and the error term, thus resulting in biased and inconsistent markup estimates. This weakness was identified by Roeger (1995) who pointed out that the difference between the change in price and the weighted change in factor input prices must be taken into consideration. By applying this formulation, one obtains
where ut is the rental cost of capital. By subtracting (3) from (2) the productivity shock is cancelled out, thus obtaining
This is the final equation provided by Roeger (1995) that reflects the degree of market power.
By re-arranging the terms, it follows
This is the main formulation developed and utilized by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011) and it is the markup equation which is going to be employed in the present study. For simplicity, it is assumed that
where reflects the growth rate of gross output per unit of capital, and is the growth rate of intermediate inputs and labour expenses per unit of capital. Moreover, according to this formulation, when the value of the price-cost margin is equal to unity, the market structure is perfectly competitive because the growth rate of gross output is equal to the growth rate of inputs. A value above unity shows that the industry sets a price level higher than the marginal cost of production and thus, it is described by imperfectly competitive conduct.
Consequently, the first step of the analysis will estimate equation (5) for the manufacturing and service industries over 1970-2007 in order to obtain the price-cost margin at the aggregate level. For simplicity, equation (5) is also expressed as
where reflects the price-cost margin of the aggregated manufacturing and service industry respectively over 1970-2007. The estimated parameter takes into account the whole panel of manufacturing and service sectors separately in order to obtain an aggregate estimation for both industries.
The second step of the analysis will employ the cross section specification of the HallRoeger approach by identifying the price-cost margin of the constituent manufacturing and service sectors individually over 1970-2007. Thereby, equation (6) is transformed into
where is the markup ratio of each 2-digit sector i for both industries and DSi is a cross section dummy variable (i=1,..,N denotes the number of the constituent sectors) which is set to unity for sector i and zero otherwise. This variable allows for the estimation of individual effects reflected by the manufacturing and service sectors on the price-cost margin.
The third and last step of the analysis refers to the time series specification of the Table A in appendix. The interpretation of the variables included in equations (6), (7) and (8) 
where ( − ) reflects the real interest rate, is the deflator of fixed asset investment and is the depreciation rate which is fixed at 5% across all sectors (Martins et al., 1996) . The observations were obtained by the AMECO and the World Bank database and have been fixed for all manufacturing and service sectors.
Methodology
The estimation process of the aforementioned equations takes into account the fixed and random effects models in order to identify the individual effects in the panel sample.
According to Baltagi (2001) 
where
and ̅ = 1 ∑ =1 . Since the time invariant individual effect is fixed, the difference from its mean will be zero and thus, its effect from equation (10) is eliminated.
On the other hand, a simple random effects model has the following form
and 0 = 0 + By substituting the latter into the former equation, one obtains
where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, 0 denotes the overall constant term and X'it represents the transpose time variant vector of regressors (1xk). Those terms can be viewed as the fixed part of this model. On the other hand, the random part consists of the two terms and which are correlated. In particular, is the individual effect for each sector i=1,…,N, which is not correlated with X'it and allows for differential intercepts over the given time sample and corresponds to the error term. As a result, the random effects model is preferable to the fixed effects model when correlation emerges between the individual effects and the error term of the model. Such effects can be captured by parameter and test whether the fixed or the random effects model is more suitable.
Empirical results
The estimation process of the manufacturing and service industries is conducted in three steps under which the Hall-Roeger approach is applied. The first step estimates the price-cost This process will provide evidence about the degree of market power in the constituent industries and sectors and whether the findings suggest imperfect competitive conduct. Kvålseth (1985) , where is the dependent variable and ̂ denotes the fitted value of . * Significant at the 5% level of significance. ** Significant at the 1% level of significance. suggest that the three Hall-Roeger specifications for both industries are subject to such dependency, thus preventing the use of the pooled OLS estimation technique due to this form of contemporaneous correlation. In addition, the fixed effects model is formulated using the dummy variables least squares technique (LSDV); while the random effects model is estimated using the generalized least squares (GLS) in order to take into consideration the presence of correlation between the individual effects and the error term. Therefore, the Hausman test (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) is employed in order to identify which model is best suited under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. Moreover, White's test (White, 1980) and the Breusch and Godfrey LM test (Bresuch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978) are used in order to identify the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the panel data sample.
According to the results, the three specifications for both industries are estimated using the fixed effects model. However, given the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation technique is applied in order to take into consideration those problems. The estimated markups for the manufacturing industry are presented in Table 2 . The price-cost margin is equal to 1.180. A value equal to unity suggests that the growth rate of gross output is equal to the growth rate of inputs and thus, the price level is equal to the marginal cost of production. The value of the manufacturing industry shows that the price expected that sectors with a limited number of firms will tend to be more oligopolistic compared to sectors with many firms. Also, innovating firms will have the option to charge a higher price level as a result of increasing the quality of their products, thus rendering them more attractive to both domestic and foreign markets 7 .
However, in order to conclude that the manufacturing industry operates under imperfect competition, we must also estimate the price-cost margin for each year individually.
For this reason, the Hall-Roeger time series specification is applied on equation (6) Source: Estimations of equation (8).
7 Nevertheless, Giokas, Eriotis and Dokas (2015) argue that the capital stock of the Greek manufacturing sectors was not improved significantly over 1995-2003. This means that technological progress on average was not the main tool of competition. The results are presented in the last column of Table 2 The evidence presented for the manufacturing industry validate the results of Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011 , 2012a , 2012b , 2013 and Polemis (2014a Polemis ( , 2014b Polemis ( , 2014c ) about the imperfect competitive market structure. The values may vary because of the different data set and the underlying methodology but the empirical suggestions point to the direction of imperfect competition in the industry. Notes: The values in parentheses are t-statistics. "-" denotes lack of observations in some variables. *Significant at the 5% level of significance. ** Significant at the 1% level of significance.
The markup estimates for the service sectors are presented in Table 3 . In particular, the value for the service industry is equal to 1.311 denoting that the industry has been charging a price level 31% higher than marginal cost over 1970-2007. This value is higher compared to the one of the manufacturing industry, thus indicating that the service industry is less competitive. This outcome validates the suggestions of several studies, such as Molnár (2010) and Molnár and Bottini (2010) marginal cost by more than 100% suggesting that the market structure of those sectors is highly oligopolistic. These markup ratios may be interpreted according to the degree of product differentiation, as service provision is considered to be quite heterogeneous across firms and sectors. [1985] [1986] , the price markup fell close to the level of perfect competition, but four years later it converged to its average value. Over the period 1990-1993, the ratio fell due to the implementation of the SEM which enhanced competition. Therefore, the outcome of this framework led to increased competitive interactions in both industries of this study.
The following years are characterized by volatile fluctuations as 1998 is considered to be the year over which the industry was operating according to perfect competition. However Polemis (2014a Polemis ( , 2014b Polemis ( , 2014c ). An interpretation of this outcome may lie on the econometrics procedure and the panel techniques employed in this study 9 . Moreover, the cross section and time series specification extend the analysis to the investigation of sectorial and annual industrial pricing behaviour. Consequently, the present study complements the argument that (i) the Greek manufacturing and service industries exert positive markup levels and (ii) the service industry is less competitive than the manufacturing industry.
Conclusion
This study extended the market power investigation in the Greek manufacturing and service industries by employing the markup model formulated by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) . A possible remedy that would enhance the forces and incentives of competition in these industries might refer to the re-introduction of developmental and operational programs, as in 1993, that will contribute to the innovative and technological infrastructure of the Greek sectors. In particular, the European Commission (2012) is working on a policy framework for the European Union members under which domestic markets will achieve new levels of growth by developing fully integrated networks that will enhance the economies overall. One of the most important factors that may contribute to this outcome is the enhancement of business environment by introducing opportunities for active and new entrepreneurs.
A possible barrier that prevents such opportunities may refer to barriers to entry due to market power acquisition by the incumbent firms. According to IOBE (2014), the Greek business environment leaves little place for new firms to operate because of the presence of heavy regulation and monitoring imposed by oligopolistic firms. Consequently, barriers to entry in oligopolistic markets should be eliminated so that new entrepreneurs can start their business in the Greek manufacturing and service industries.
Moreover, the findings of this study complement the arguments of the OECD that the Greek economy and in particular, the manufacturing industry is under-performing (OECD 2012 (OECD , 2014 . There are 555 problematic regulations identified where 329 of them could be improved by enhancing competition. This means that the Greek manufacturing industry is heavily regulated, thus constraining its efficiency and capacity that results in welfare losses and market power exploitation. The second report focuses on the sectors of beverages (i.e. 11); textiles, clothing apparel and leather (i.e. 13, 14 and 15); machinery and equipment (i.e. 28); and coke and refined petroleum products (i.e. 19). The findings are once again in favour of regulations that harm competition. This argument is validated by the positive price-cost margins presented in Table 2 . As a result, the OECD makes 88 recommendations on improving legal frameworks by utilizing the EU legislation that minimizes barriers to entry and promotes incentives for innovation.
To this end, innovation can be considered as a significant factor of competition through which firms will achieve economies of scale and diversify their products in order to enhance their sales. If innovation leads to this outcome, particular firms will gain competitive advantage against their competitors. When the same rationale is adopted by every market participant, the degree of imperfect competition will be reduced. Therefore, the Scumpeterian creative destruction will run its course by forcing inefficient and non-competitive firms to exit the market (Reinert and Reinert, 2006) .
Overall, the present study provides evidence of an imperfect competitive market structure in the Greek manufacturing and service industries. Future research could take into consideration more disaggregated data at a firm level and test the pattern of the price-cost margin of the manufacturing and service firms. Moreover, the same methodology can be applied in the economies of the European Union and investigate whether the markup ratios across countries appear to be correlated because of the SEM framework. As a result, the market structure in the European manufacturing and service sectors will be investigated over 
